From:
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/tss-1-e.htm
+ Thanks to the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police +
In Consultation with others...
This is one of a series of publications on security published by the lead security agencies and central agencies in consultation with departments. The series is designed to help all departments meet the requirements and standards set out in the Security policy and appendices. [Links]
Published by the RCMP in consultation with: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat , Communications Security Establishment, Information Technology Security Committee.
The Technical Security Standard for Information Technology is protected by Crown copyright; permission is granted to copy and distribute it freely within the Canadian federal government and other levels of Canadian government only.
This document, "Technical Security Standard for Information Technology" (TSSIT), is designed to assist users in implementing cost-effective security in their information technology (IT) environments. The purpose of TSSIT is to set out the detailed administrative, technical and procedural safeguards required in an IT environment in order to implement the requirements of the "Security" volume, Treasury Board Manual, herein referred to as the "Security Policy of the Government of Canada" (GSP).
This document is a technical-level standard for the protection of classified and designated information stored, processed or communicated on electronic data processing equipment. Government information is to be adequately protected through good, basic information management and physical and materiel management procedures.
This technical standard has been developed, approved and issued pursuant to the lead agency role of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as stated in the guidelines to the GSP. As such, TSSIT is third-level documentation as outlined in the GSP, Chapter 2- 1, "Security Organization and Administration Standard".
As permitted by the GSP, when applying standards, departments may decide, on the basis of a threat and risk assessment and after consultation with the lead security agencies, to substitute alternative measures. When substituting alternative measures, care must be taken not to compromise the consistency and therefore the integrity of government-wide protection measures.
Advice and guidance on applying this standard can be obtained from the departmental security authority and from the lead agencies.
1. INTRODUCTION / 1.1 Purpose / 1.2 Scope / 1.3 Documents / Reference Documents / Related Documents / Related COMSEC Documents / 1.4 General Requirements / 1.5 System Operational Considerations / 1.5.1 General / 1.5.2 Modes of Operation / Dedicated Mode / System-High Mode / Multilevel Mode / 1.6 Security Summary Table / INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY SUMMARY TABLE / 2. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY / 2.1 Information Technology Security Organization / 2.1.1 Appointment of Security Personnel / 2.1.2 Responsibilities of Security Personnel / 2.2 Information Technology Security Administration / 2.2.1 Security Policy and Procedures / 2.2.2 Classification and Designation of Sensitive Information and Assets / 2.2.3 Statements of Sensitivity / 2.2.4 Contracting / 2.2.5 Threat and Risk Assessments / 2.2.6 Access Control and Authorization / 2.2.7 Security Logs and Records 2.2.8 Security Investigations / 2.2.9 Security Reviews / 2.3 Integrity and Availability Measures / 2.3.1 Separation of Duties / 2.3.2 Contingency Planning / 2.3.3 Critical Human Resources / 3. PERSONNEL SECURITY / Introduction / 3.1 Security Screening / 3.2 Security Awareness / 3.3 Training of Personnel / 3.4 Transfer of Personnel / 3.5 Termination of Employment / 4. PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY / Introduction / 4.1 Facility and Equipment Location / 4.1.1 Information Technology Facilities / 4.2 Access Control / 4.2.1 Restricted Zones / 4.2.2 Security Containers / 4.2.3 Methods of Controlling Access / 4.2.4 Methods of Authorizing Access / 4.2.5 Methods of Monitoring Access / 4.3 IT Utilities and Services / 4.3.1 General / 4.3.2 Electrical Systems / 4.3.3 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems / 4.4 Fire Protection / 4.4.1 IT Equipment / 4.4.2 Record Storage / 4.5 Destruction of IT Media / 4.6 Offsite Facilities / 4.7 Transport and Transmittal / 4.8 Evacuation Procedures
This document, Technical Security Standard for Information Technology (TSSIT), is intended to assist departments in achieving a minimum level of security for classified and designated information and assets and is based on the principles and requirements of the "Security Policy of the Government of Canada" (GSP). All government information is to be adequately protected through good, basic management procedures and practices. This standard contains both requirements, indicated by use of the word "shall", and recommended safeguards, indicated by use of the word "should".
TSSIT is used by the Security Evaluation and Inspection Team (SEIT) of the RCMP as evaluation criteria for system reviews (computer systems and computer-based networks including local area networks).
The level of security established by TSSIT requirements not only protects a department's assets, but also provides assurance that shared assets will receive a minimum level of protection regardless of the location.
Diverse applications and variation in technical implementations make it impractical to provide specific and detailed safeguards for every possible Information Technology (IT) situation. Additional safeguards are to be applied based on a threat and risk assessment (TRA).
Further, the safeguards detailed in this document do not adequately cover the processing of Top Secret information or aggregates of information necessitating a classification of Top Secret. When it is necessary to process such information, a TRA is to be used as the basis for establishing the security requirements and the relevant departmental security authority must be contacted to determine appropriate additional protective measures in conjunction with Information Technology Security Section of the RCMP and other security authorities as required.
TSSIT applies to all government departments listed in Schedule I, Parts I and II, of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, and to the Canadian Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). It also should be applied contractually where government information is processed by the private sector. This can be accomplished with appropriate contract security clauses based on TSSIT.
Consistent with changes in policy or technology, TSSIT will be reviewed and amended as and when necessary. A comprehensive review will be conducted at least every five years.
Questions concerning the application or interpretation of this standard, and suggestions concerning amendments should be directed to your departmental security authority, who may refer such questions and suggestions to:
The Commissioner |
Royal Canadian Mounted Police |
1200 Vanier Parkway, Ottawa, Ontario, KlA 0R2 |
Attention:Officer-in-Charge, Information Technology Security Section |
Reference Documents · Access to Information Act · Financial Administration Act · Interim Policy Guide: Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, Parts II and III · Interpretation Act · Official Secrets Act · Privacy Act · Public Service Employment Act · Public Service Staff Relations Act · Tenants Act · "Security" volume, Treasury Board Manual (Cat. No. BT52-6/3), commonly known as the "Government Security Policy" (GSP). · Guide to the Audit of Security (OCG Guide 406) · Guide to Threat and Risk Assessment for Information Technology (RCMP)
Related Documents
Related COMSEC Documents (available from the Communications Security Establishment).
IT security is the protection of systems, information and services from accidental and deliberate threats to confidentiality, integrity and availability. IT security is considered to consist of seven components: administrative and organizational security, personnel security, physical security, hardware security, communications security, software security and operations security. These components are applicable to all types of systems from personal computers to local area networks, mini-computers and mainframes. Some of the criteria are technology specific but the intent is applicable to all environments. For the purpose of this document, a network is a system consisting of a connection of computers and devices using communications technology. Specific network issues, including architecture, management, interconnection and operating systems, are integral parts of the above components.
The GSP makes departments responsible for the protection of sensitive information and assets, including information technology systems, based on threat and risk assessment and the application of minimum standards. While complete security is generally considered unattainable, cost-effective safeguards can be chosen which will adequately reduce the risks to an acceptable level.
The requirement for security implies the existence of an internal organization consisting of positions with defined responsibilities which are occupied by personnel who have received IT security training and who will be responsible in attending to security concerns. The requirements for such positions will depend on the size of the organization, e.g. in smaller organizations these responsibilities could be carried out as part of the duties of some other function. The fundamental elements of such organizations are defined in Administrative and Organizational Security (Chapter 2).
Security must be predicated on the loyalty and reliability of all personnel involved. The methods to be used in determining such attributes and in ensuring that personnel are made aware of their security responsibilities are contained in Personnel Security (Chapter 3). The physical and environmental requirements which are necessary to isolate the IT environment from extraneous factors are outlined in Physical and Environmental Security (Chapter 4).
Engineering of systems must follow accepted practices to ensure that security features are integrated and that there is a level of assurance or confidence in their effectiveness. Chapters 5 through 8 (Hardware, Communications, Software, Operations) deal with internal security features provided by systems and security management of these disciplines.
It will often be desirable to mix applications and data of different sensitivities on a single system or network. Ideally, it would be convenient to identify explicitly the various mixes of sensitivities which could be accommodated without undue risk in any given type of system. Unfortunately, since the combinations of sensitivity and technical implementations are numerous, identification of such mixes would be virtually impossible. Each individual configuration and mix must be analyzed for appropriate controls.
The primary criterion in the choice of a system must be the acceptability of the others with whom the system resources are shared. It must be assumed that a knowledgeable user will find ways to circumvent normal protective mechanisms if sufficient motivation exists. For this reason, if the other users cannot be identified, or if they are known but are not totally acceptable, sensitive resources should not be shared without the strict controls of a multi-level environment.
Conversely, if all users of a system are known and identifiable and can be allowed to legitimately gain access to any information on the system, they can be considered singly and collectively to be responsible for the protection of the information. The security concern is therefore minimal and efforts can be concentrated on ensuring that unauthorized persons cannot gain access.
Often, while users are all known and acceptable, they cannot be permitted access to all system and data resources because they do not share a common need-to- know. Although security clearance procedures are in effect, they alone cannot be expected to ensure that all users can be explicitly trusted. Furthermore, system isolation mechanisms may fail causing an inadvertent unauthorized disclosure.
In such cases, it is sometimes possible to provide third party intervention between users and the system. While this may have the effect of increasing the number of personnel required, it provides the capability of manually monitoring system use and improving the separation-of-duties concept. The rules under which the third party intervention is applied can be set to match the system sensitivity.
If third party intervention is not possible, then most of the security mechanisms must be based on the automated responses of the system. For example, if the risk in a particular environment is high, then systems with high assurance levels for protective mechanisms should be used.
Finally, one must examine the capability or privileges granted to users. Compensatory controls can be applied to some privileges. For example, the privilege of being allowed to update transactions on a system can be coupled with controls which provide auditability of transactions. However, in general, if users are allowed to introduce instructions into a system by utilizing compilers, assemblers, interpreters or translators, the possibility of deliberate compromise of a system is greatly increased. For this reason, programming should not be allowed on highly sensitive systems during production periods and must be controlled at all times.
It is these conditions which will be assessed in determining the level of information that may be processed on the system without compromising the confidentiality, availability and integrity requirements. The statement of sensitivity, which contains the confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements for an application and the intended user base, must therefore be taken into consideration when determining an acceptable "Mode of Operation" for processing an application.
This section describes the three modes of operation. Although the differences in the three modes are based on confidentiality requirements, processing in any given mode also has an effect on the availability and integrity requirements of computer systems and networks.
A system is operating in the dedicated mode when all the following statements are satisfied concerning the users with access to the system, network, its peripherals, remote equipment, or hosts.
A system is operating in the system-high mode when all the following statements are satisfied concerning the users with access to the system, network, its peripherals, remote equipment or hosts.
A system is operating in the multilevel mode when all the following statements are satisfied concerning the users with access to the system, network, its peripherals, remote equipment or hosts.
The selection of safeguards for each mode depends on a number of interrelated factors identified by a TRA, including sensitivity level, user access requirements and external communications. For example, basic safeguards for a system in the System-High Mode processing sensitive information at the Protected-A level would include assignment of security responsibilities, contingency plans, enhanced reliability screening for users, physical access control of servers and work areas, logical access control functionality and controlled dial communications.
Many security components must be considered when processing government information. It is therefore essential that all aspects of the IT environment be evaluated in relation to the security requirements when selecting safeguards. The Security Summary Table, which is intended as a guide only, highlights topics to be considered when determining the safeguards required in an IT environment. The table is a summary of procedural, personnel, physical and environmental, system and communications safeguards. These areas are complementary, and no one area is more important than another.
The three fonts used in the text of the table reflect increasing security concerns within a security area. The regular font, italic font and SMALL CAP font indicate safeguards increasing from basic to more sophisticated protection. There is no ranking or intended order within each font.
Some topics are repeated in different areas in the table, e.g. "Training" and "Access Controls". This repetition indicates the topic is integral to each area in which it is found.
More details on the topics listed in the Summary Table are contained in the various chapters of this document.
CONFIDENTIALITY |
AVAILABILITY |
INTEGRITY |
|
Increasing Protection from Regular to Italic to SM CAP | |||
PROCEDURAL
|
Assignment of responsibilities
Separation of duties Classification procedures System Development Life Cycle Standards/policies Business resumption plan Statement of sensitivity Security clauses in contracts |
Log review
Backups & recovery Written procedures System Development Life Cycle Contracts of
Specify
Contingency planning Business resumption plan |
Change control
Media marking Log procedures and review Verification Security audit Testing |
PERSONNEL |
Training awareness
Correct screening/clearances Termination procedures Security clauses in contracts Separation of dutiesNeed to knowMUTUAL ACCESSIBILITY ACCESS VERIFICATION |
Training
Designated employees Backup personnel specified Emergency Response TeamRECOVERY TEAM |
Training
Job description Job responsibilities Termination procedures ACCESS AUTHENTIFICATION |
PHYSICAL & ENVIRONMENTAL |
Access controls
Doors correctly securedWalls slab to slabWaste disposalINTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION OF AUTHORIZATION |
Environmental controls
Fire protection Offsite storageALTERNATE SITE |
Environmental controls
Physical access controlsTransportation of media |
SYSTEM
|
System access control
File access control Separation of
Trusted computing at C1/C2 level Separation of physical mediaTransaction loggingAuditRestriction of privilegesand capabilitiesTrusted computing at B1/B2 levelENCRYPTION TRUSTED COMPUTING AT B3/A1 LEVEL TEMPEST |
Maintenance
Change control Inventory HW/SW Offsite backup of both system SW and data Minimum configuration Uninterruptible power sourceHardware redundancyALTERNATE FACILITIES (CONTINGENCY PLANNING |
Change control
Restriction of privileges and capabilities Configuration control Maintenance Range checksValue checksError detectionError correctionCHECKSUMS LOGGING - ERRORS AUDIT JOURNALS AUTHENTIFICATION |
COMMUNICATIONS |
Configuration
Surveillance Log review Change control Access controlAuthenticationApproved TYPE II encryptionTempestHIGHGRADE (TYPE I) ENCRYPTION |
Configuration
Change control Log review Specify
Alternate routingDUPLICATE SERVICES |
Configuration
Change control Surveillance Error detection Re-transmission Log review AUTHENTIFICATION |
3.The IT security coordinator should have a functional reporting relationship to the DSO and be responsible for:
4.The COMSEC authority should be responsible for:
1.TRAs that address all IT systems shall be prepared and maintained. Those TRAs shall outline existing and proposed safeguards and describe threats and risks of which account has been taken.
1.Access privileges to system and information resources shall be authorized and controlled for:
2.Departments shall ensure that, prior to being granted access to system and information resources, each individual shall sign a witnessed and dated acknowledgement that a specific dated version of the rules and regulations governing such access has been read and agreed upon. This acknowledgement shall be maintained for a minimum of one year after the employee terminates employment.
3.Rules and regulations associated with access to system and IT resources should stipulate:
4. Mechanisms and procedures shall be implemented to audit compliance with the rules and regulations governing access to system and information resources.
3.All suspected security incidents affecting the IT environment shall be recorded and reported to the appropriate authority.
1.Departments shall request reviews of their IT security programs by the Security Evaluation and Inspection Team (SEIT) of the RCMP to determine the security status of their IT facilities.
Departments shall request SEIT reviews according to the following schedule:
ITS programs involving:
· A review shall be requested immediately following a major security incident.
· A review shall be requested immediately, for cause, based on the following security-relevant major events in the system life cycle:
SEIT will conduct a preliminary review, including a review of any previous SEIT report, the results of which will determine whether a full review is to be carried out, consultation given or such other action taken as is applicable, e.g. further follow-up on a previous SEIT report.
2.Departments shall, within six months of receipt of the SEIT review report, inform SEIT of their plan to deal with identified problems. Departments will provide SEIT with an annual progress report until all recommendations are successfully completed.
3.Departments shall conduct and document an annual security review of IT-related activities.
4.Where plans require the use of facilities not under the control of the department, formal agreements or contracts for the use of such facilities shall be established and reviewed annually.
5.Departments shall ensure that the implementation of contingency plans does not compromise confidentiality or integrity requirements.
6.Current copies of all contingency plans, procedures and agreements shall be maintained in at least two geographically-separate locations.
7.Contingency plans should be tested annually to the extent practicable and remain consistent with security.
This chapter establishes criteria for implementing personnel security within both federal government departments and firms subject to federal contracts. It is based on the premise that the security screening process will have been conducted in accordance with the GSP, Chapter 2-4, Personnel Security Standard.
Special attention to personnel security is required where access is granted to sensitive IT systems, information or assets. Extensive holdings of sensitive information are stored on IT systems and media. The sheer volume and availability of this information are only two reasons why the information is more vulnerable, thus requiring additional personnel security measures.
1.Managers are responsible for:
2. If new duties or tasks require an individual's personnel screening level to be:
· higher, departments shall:
· lower, departments shall:
· reactivated after a previous lowering, the original status or clearance:
through such means as;
3. Security briefings shall be given to personnel and contractors who will have access to sensitive IT systems, information or assets. These briefings should include:
4. Conduct security briefings in person, where possible, and include a written document outlining the contents of the briefing and date given. The document should be signed by the person briefed indicating receipt of, and agreement to, its contents.
1.Personnel shall be trained on IT security principles, features and vulnerabilities of sensitive IT systems, information or assets. This training should be designed for various personnel, such as IT security coordinators, system administrators, and system users.
1.Procedures shall be documented and implemented to ensure that when personnel or contractors are transferred by appointment, assignment, deployment or secondment, all access privileges to IT systems, information or assets are reviewed, modified or revoked accordingly.
1.Procedures shall be documented and implemented to ensure that prior to termination of an individual's employment or contract:
This chapter establishes physical and environmental security criteria intended to protect sensitive IT systems, information or assets. Environmental security includes both utilities and services supporting IT and, by extension, the security of those utilities and services.
IT systems and media contain concentrated amounts of information and therefore warrant special attention. Areas housing IT systems may require additional physical security safeguards.
An IT facility is the setting used for the location of IT assets such as mini-computers and mainframe computers, LAN servers and telecommunications centres.
1.Minimize risks to IT systems by choosing facility locations with due regard for such threats as: floods and earthquakes, electromagnetic interference and emanations, criminal activity and industrial accidents. Also consider the ease and effectiveness of controlling access in multi-tenant or public buildings.
For detailed information on site selection, refer to Guide to the Preparation of Physical Security Briefs, SSB/SG-25.
2.Where site selection cannot compensate for identified risks, identify perimeter security measures. Such measures can include fences, walls or other barriers, and the removal of trees, embankments, or other obstructions that could be used to carry out an attack.
3.Areas containing sensitive IT systems, information or assets should be located so as to minimize exposure to threats such as:
4.In addition to locating sensitive equipment in appropriate restricted zones, (see 4.3.1) consideration should be given to the positioning of the equipment within the zone to prevent unauthorized overview. This can be achieved by:
5.Where the use of shielded enclosures is necessary, compliance with the requirements of Specifications for the Design, Fabrication, Supply, Installation and Acceptance Testing of Radio Frequency Shielded Enclosures (CID/09/12) is mandatory.
6.Where the use of TEMPEST-compliant equipment is necessary, compliance with the requirements of COMSEC Installation Planning (TEMPEST Guidance) (CID/09/7A) is mandatory.
7.TEMPEST-compliant equipment shall, if possible, be installed and operated in a dedicated restricted zone, established as a Security Zone at a minimum, and separated by physical barriers from adjacent areas.
8.If the TRA does not support a dedicated restricted zone for TEMPEST-compliant equipment:
9.To prevent compromise of the TEMPEST-compliant equipment or information by unauthorized overview or physical access, the equipment shall be positioned:
10.TEMPEST-compliant equipment shall not be moved or tampered with after installation and testing without the approval of the appropriate COMSEC authority.
1.Departments shall establish the appropriate type and number of restricted zones for the location of sensitive IT systems, assets, information and supporting utilities. These utilities and services include: heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems (HVAC), electrical, uninterruptible power supply (UPS), and fire protection systems.
Rooms specially designed for such IT assets as mini-computers and mainframe computers, LAN servers, and telecommunications centres must also be managed as restricted zones. Such rooms will be referred to as IT facilities.
2.Access to restricted zones shall be controlled, authorized and monitored as appropriate to the zone.
3.Maintenance and service personnel, such as customer-engineers, electricians and plumbers shall, when servicing sensitive IT systems, be properly escorted and supervised by someone responsible to the department with enough background, training or qualifications to understand the risks associated with the work being done and provide assurance that only authorized access to sensitive information or assets takes place.
4.Signs or other information revealing the purpose or location of restricted zones as they relate to sensitive IT systems, information or assets should not be posted in areas accessible to the general public such as lobbies, waiting rooms and reception zones.
5.If signs are used to identify restricted zones, they should:
For further information on keys and containers refer to:
1. Appropriate methods for controlling access to restricted zones include:
3.Access records maintained for restricted zones should include the following details to be meaningful for security audit purposes:
4.Access records maintained for restricted zones shall be reviewed by security personnel and retained for at least one year from the end of the current calendar year.
1.Access to Security and High-Security Zones shall be monitored. Access to Operations Zones should be monitored periodically based on a TRA. Monitoring methods can include:
2.An identification card should be issued to employees and contractors requiring access to IT facilities. Approved identification card specifications include:
3. Departments implementing an identification card or access badge system for facilities shall establish procedures for:
4.Records pertaining to the issue and retrieval of identification cards and access badges shall include the following information:
5.Records shall be maintained documenting the issue and retrieval of security- related items such as:
6.All persons authorized to enter restricted zones should be issued, and required to wear, an approved access badge (building pass or recognition badge).
7.Access badges should meet the following minimum requirements:
For further information refer to Identification Cards / Access Badges, SSB/SG-27.
3.Procedures shall be documented and implemented to ensure that all environmental support equipment faults are:
4.All changes to environmental support equipment shall be centrally controlled, authorized and documented.
5.Rooms housing utilities and services supporting IT equipment, and exterior air intakes located outside restricted zones established within a facility, shall be protected according to the TRA.
3.Electrical systems for IT facilities shall conform to the "Fire Protection Standard for Electronic Data Processing Equipment", Treasury Board Manual, Occupational Safety and Health, Chapter 3-3. Primary areas include:
4.Power services for IT equipment shall be consistent with manufacturers' specifications, and where necessary, equipped with power conditioners capable of providing a stable power supply.
3.External openings for HVAC systems shall be screened or filtered to protect against the insertion of hazardous objects or the intrusion of pollutants.
4.Where criticality of service is a concern, redundant air conditioning capacity should be provided.
1.Computer systems considered either essential or non-essential but of high value (exceeding $1 million), shall comply with the requirements of the "Fire Protection Standard for Electronic Data Processing Equipment", Treasury Board Manual, Occupational Safety and Health, Chapter 3-3.
1.Records stored and handled in IT facilities shall be managed according to the requirements set out in Record Storage, FC 311(M), including:
3.The destruction of IT media containing sensitive information shall be monitored by an employee with a security screening level at least equal to the highest sensitivity of the information.
For further information on destruction, see these documents:
1.Evacuation procedures for IT facilities shall be documented to ensure personnel safety and to maintain security of sensitive information and assets during and following evacuation. Evacuation procedures should include:
2. Evacuation procedures for IT facilities shall be distributed and regularly tested to ensure that: